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Abstract
Multinomial logit is the canonical model of discrete choice and widely used to an-
alyze preferences and welfare. Its axiomatic foundation is incomplete: binomial
logit is assumed; independence of irrelevant alternatives extends logit to multino-
mial choice. The present paper provides a self-contained foundation, showing that
the axiom “binomial choice is logit” is behaviorally founded by “narrow bracketing”
and “no systematic mistakes” (e.g. default effects). This in turn allows me to drop
the no-mistakes axiom, yielding generalized logit accounting for systematic mis-
takes axiomatically consistently. The results position logit in the “mistakes-debate”
in behavioral welfare and clarify the foundation for the functional form.
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1 Introduction
Many economic studies analyze preferences or welfare, be it empirically, experimentally,
or theoretically. Under the classical assumption that agents maximize utility, preferences
and welfare can be inferred from choice by revealed preference. Behavioral analyses,
however, have found choice to exhibit systematic biases (e.g. default effects) and to be
stochastic—subjects’ choices are incoherent and do not reliably reveal preference. This
has inspired an enormous literature of models on stochastic choice to control for noise
in preference estimation (Luce, 1959) and welfare analyses (Small and Rosen, 1981;
Hanemann, 1984).
The central model in this literature is multinomial logit proposed by McFadden
(1974).1 McFadden (2001) attributes its appeal to the availability of “fully consistent
descriptions” in terms of both an axiomatic foundation and a random utility represen-
tation. While there are many models with random utility representations, the axiomatic
foundation of logit makes it special—logit appears to require little more than Luce’s inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). To provide just one example of this perception,
Fudenberg and Strzalecki (2015) assume “IIA (so that static choice is logit)” (p. 654).
That is, while IIA does not suffice to derive multinomial logit, the difference between
IIA and multinomial logit is perceived to be minor.
This perception is wrong. One of McFadden’s axioms implicitly assumes that bino-
mial choice is logit. IIA merely provides the extension of logit to multinomial choice.
The present paper shows that the axiom “binomial choice is logit” is behaviorally founded
in axioms on narrow bracketing and absence of systematic mistakes (i.e. choice biases
such as default effects). This relates logit to recent discussions in behavioral economics
and behavioral welfare, and perhaps most importantly, the self-contained foundation
opens the door to study generalized models without assuming absence of systematic
mistakes. I show that dropping this axiom yields a surprisingly tractable extension of
multinomial logit, which in turn shows how to account for choice biases such as default
effects in an axiomatically consistent manner.
This is discussed in detail in the concluding section. As point of departure, let us
review the received axiomatic foundation (McFadden, 1974). Consider a decision maker
1The long list of studies studying preferences using multinomial logit includes analyses of risk pref-
erences (Holt and Laury, 2002; Goeree et al., 2003), social preferences (Cappelen et al., 2007; Bellemare
et al., 2008), and preferences and demand functions of consumers (McFadden, 1980; Berry et al., 1995).
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(DM) with utility function u. The probability that DM chooses option x from a finite op-
tion set B is denoted as Pr(x|u,B). Assume all choice probabilities are positive and satisfy
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA); formal statements follow below. Positivity
and IIA imply that DM’s choice probabilities can be represented as
Pr(x|u,B) = exp{V (x,y|u)}
∑x′∈B exp{V (x′,y|u)}
(1)
for some function V , given an arbitrary benchmark option y ∈ B. The relation of V
to DM’s true utility function, which is u by assumption, is unrestricted. A number of
existing studies argue that V can be considered to represent DM’s utility function, but this
relation is formally unfounded. McFadden (1974) obtains Eq. (1) by defining V (x,y|u)
to be the log-odds of the choice between x and y,
V (x,y|u) = log
(
Pr(x|u,{x,y})
Pr(y|u,{x,y})
)
. (2)
In order to pin down the relationship between V and u, McFadden uses Axiom 3 (page
110) which assumes additive separability of V as follows:2
V (x,y|u) = u(x)−u(y). (3)
McFadden refers to Axiom 3 as “Irrelevance of Alternative Set Effect”, but as Eq. (1)
holds independently of which y ∈ B is chosen as benchmark option, this irrelevance ob-
tains in any case. To understand Axiom 3, recall that V are log-odds. Using V ’s definition,
Axiom 3 turns out to be equivalent to assuming
Pr(x|u,{x,y})
Pr(y|u,{x,y}) = exp{u(x)−u(y)} ⇔ Pr(x|u,{x,y}) =
exp{u(x)}
exp{u(x)}+ exp{u(y)} .
The latter equation is the definition of binomial logit. That is, the assumed “Irrelevance of
Alternative Set Effect” is equivalent to assuming that binomial choice is logit. Given this
structure of binomial choice, IIA ensures that multinomial choice is multinomial logit. In
turn, the core assumption, that binomial choice is logit, is not axiomatically founded and
the assumptions actually underlying logit analyses are unclear.
By identifying and correcting this gap in logit’s axiomatic foundation, the present
2Note that McFadden’s notation differs slightly, as the primitives of his analysis are individual attributes
rather than individual utilities.
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paper shows that logit actually is based on the assumptions that choice satisfies a form
of narrow bracketing and does not reflect systematic mistakes.3 This in turn allows us to
drop the no-mistakes assumption, to obtain a generalized logit model showing how to ac-
count for systematic mistakes, and connects logit to two lively discussions in behavioral
economics and behavioral welfare economics.
To clarify the relation to the literature, let me first address the no-mistakes assump-
tion, which is at the center of debate in behavioral welfare economics (Gul and Pe-
sendorfer, 2007; Bernheim and Rangel, 2007; Ko˝szegi and Rabin, 2007). In the words
of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2008b, p. 193), choice exhibits systematic biases if DMs “take
actions that they would not take could they fully assess the distribution of all relevant
consequences of those actions”. Prevalence of systematic biases requires the distinction
of decision utility, which rationalizes choice, and true utility, which represents the deci-
sion maker’s actual well-being. Welfare then equates with well-being and is consequently
not revealed by choice (Ko˝szegi and Rabin, 2008a,b). Since the distinction of decision
utility and true utility is not identified based on choice data, equally feasible approaches
are to postulate that the alleged mistakes are founded in the true utility function (Gul
and Pesendorfer, 2001, 2008) or to weaken the notion of revealed preference (see e.g.
Bernheim and Rangel, 2009; Bernheim, 2009).
As shown below, logit’s position in this debate is clear, equality of true utility and
decision utility is assumed and systematic biases are thus assumed away. That is, using
logit assumes that choice biases due to defaults, positioning, round numbers, or left-most
digits (all of which will be discussed below) are rooted in the true utility function. As I
also show, analysts need not take this position. Dropping the no-mistakes axiom yields a
generalized form of logit that, by nature of the dropped axiom, allows to account for sys-
tematic mistakes without rooting them in the true utility function. Perhaps surprisingly,
these approaches are almost equivalent: If we assume choice biases are not rooted in the
true utility function, then their behavioral foundation shows up as a summand next to the
true utility function. Specifically, in generalized logit, DM with true utility u chooses
x ∈ B with probability
Pr(x|u,B) = exp{λ ·u(x)+w(x)}
∑x′∈B exp{λ ·u(x′)+w(x′)}
. (4)
3Here, narrow bracketing requires choice probabilities to be invariant to level shifts of utility, which
holds true if each choice task is considered in isolation. For related behavioral analyses, see e.g. Read
et al. (1999) and Rabin and Weizsäcker (2009). Further, in this introduction, I skip the technical axioms
“positivity” and “richness” which are standard and ensure uniqueness of the logit representation.
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If one assumes that choice biases represent deviations from utility maximization, their
behavioral foundation shows up as additively separable components next to utilities.
The simplicity of this (axiomatically derived) approach toward systematic mistakes is
of course convenient, and with hindsight little surprising, as it once more shows that the
distinction of true utility and decision utility is not identified based on choice data alone:
the two approaches to either include w(x) in the true utilities or treat it as an additively
separable component are behaviorally equivalent. This finding directly relates to Gul
and Pesendorfer (2001), who essentially argue to include properties of the option set in
the utility function. The behavioral equivalence of the two approaches does not imply
their normative equivalence, of course. As for normative analyses, we need to know if
w(x) is part of the true utility or not, which consequently requires additional sources of
information (for discussion, see Benkert and Netzer, 2015).
The generalized logit model obtained here resembles the generalized logit model
that Matejka and McKay (2015) obtained by analyzing rational inattention in discrete
choice. The formal definitions even appear to be identical. This is in some sense reassur-
ing, although the models actually are fundamentally different: the generalization of logit
obtained here satisfies IIA while Matejka and McKay’s does not. Further, the secondary
components w(x) obtained here are shown not to relate to payoffs or utilities, and by their
compatibility with IIA they cannot relate to payoff relations across options in any way.
Hence, they represent choice biases not related to utilities, many of which have been
identified as the aforementioned presentation effects due to e.g. defaults or positioning.
In contrast, the foundation of Matejka and McKay’s model in rational inattention implies
that it captures similarity effects, i.e. payoff similarity across options, and thus violates
IIA (as they discuss in detail).4 That said, the similarity of how logit is to be generalized
in order to capture choice biases due to either presentation effects or similarity effects is
striking. In both cases, additional summands next to the utility functions appear, which
reaffirms this “additive” representation of choice biases and additionally complies with
the general result that inequality of true utility and decision utility is not identified based
on choice data alone.
The second major discussion addressed here concerns the choice between “fully
4Matejka and McKay (2015) discuss this illuminatingly. Briefly, a DM not knowing the utilities of his
options needs to sample utilities which is costly. Assuming he does so rationally, i.e. choosing optimally
which options to sample and when to stop given the costs of sampling, yields the generalized model. The
choice of options to sample and when to stop depends on the similarity of the options’ utilities, which in
turn implies that the generalized logit model relaxes IIA and captures similarity effects.
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specified” structural models such as logit and “robust” or “non-parametric” methods such
as least squares. This discussion has been led in many fields, e.g. in empirical work
(Keane, 2010; Rust, 2010), in analyses of auctions (Bajari and Hortacsu, 2005), and in
analyses of risk and social preferences. The general argument in favor of least-squares
methods appeals to their alleged robustness, which presumably results from either weaker
or less demanding assumptions, in contrast to the seemingly specific functional form of
logit. As shown here, this specific functional form follows from relatively innocent ax-
ioms: IIA, narrow bracketing, and “decision utility = true utility”.5 IIA does not affect
the functional form at all and narrow bracketing is equally assumed in least squares anal-
yses. Further, logit’s “decision utility = true utility” can be dropped without obstructing
its functional form, while least squares essentially replaces it by assuming (i) utility itself
is not choice relevant and (ii) choice probabilities depend on the options’ distances to
the utility maximizer. Neither utility irrelevance (i) nor the presentation effect (ii) has
been observed in the vast literature on choice biases. Why should it be plausible to make
these particular assumptions about discrete choice instead of logit’s “decision utility =
true utility”? Even aside from plausibility, logit’s axioms are not formally stronger than
those underlying least squares, which renders the robustness of least squares in analyses
of discrete choice rather questionable.
Section 2 derives the main result and Section 3 further discusses the result and routes
for future work.
2 The axiomatic foundation of logit and generalized logit
A decision maker (DM) has the task to choose an option x ∈ B from a finite set B ⊆ X .
DM’s true utility is captured by u : X → R, and given u, the probability that DM chooses
x ∈ B is Pr(x|u,B). The axiomatic foundation of logit proposed here builds on the two
received axioms.
Axiom 1 (Positivity). Pr(x|u,B)> 0 for all x ∈ B⊆ X
Axiom 2 (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, IIA). For all B,B′ ⊆ X ,
Pr(x|u,B)
Pr(y|u,B) =
Pr(x|u,B′)
Pr(y|u,B′) for all x,y ∈ B∩B
′.
5Again, to be clear, positivity and richness axioms are additionally used to obtain uniqueness.
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Luce et al. (2008) provide an axiomatic foundation of Luce’s choice axiom, which
in turn implies IIA. Note that IIA is used here only for the purpose of axiomatizing logit.
Analysts may of course substitute their favorite alternative for it to study models relaxing
IIA.
Positivity allows to define IIA in the usual manner and in conjunction with IIA, it
implies that a value function v : X →R exists such that Pr(x|u,B) = v(x|u)/∑x′∈V v(x|u).
The relation of utility u and value v is essentially unrestricted, as noted in the Introduction.
One may define a function V : X → R such that V (x) = log{v(x)} and refer to V (x) as
the stimulus associated with x. Formally, though, V represents log-odds and is therefore
not related to DM’s true utility function in an explicit manner.
The third standard axiom is richness and ensures that the logit representations of
choice probabilities are uniquely adequate given the remaining axioms. Without rich-
ness, alternative representations may be viable depending on coarseness of the choice
environment. The richness assumption invoked here is satisfied if e.g. utility is contin-
uous in x and the set of potential options X , from which the experimenter designs the
experiment by selecting B, is convex.
Axiom 3 (Richness). There exist x,x′ ∈ X such that u(x) 6= u(x′). For all x,x′ ∈ X and all
λ ∈ [0,1], there exists x′′ ∈ X such that u(x′′) = λ u(x)+(1−λ) u(x′).
To introduce the novel axioms, recall that logit choice probabilities are invariant to
adding an arbitrary constant to all utilities (Block and Marschak, 1960). It is natural to
include this distinctive property of logit in any axiomatic foundation. To provide intu-
ition, level invariance is satisfied if DM considers the analyzed choice tasks in isolation,
i.e. independently of his level of utility outside the experiment. Following Read et al.
(1999), I refer to it as narrow bracketing.
Axiom 4 (Narrow bracketing). For all r ∈ R and x ∈ B⊆ X , Pr(x|u,B) = Pr(x|u+ r,B)
Narrow bracketing implies that binomial choice probabilities can be expressed as
functions of utility differences (Block and Marschak, 1960), which is satisfied for the
large class of strong utility models (including for example probit).6 The novel observation
made here is that in conjunction with richness (and IIA), narrow bracketing yields a
6Alternatively, invoking scale invariance as opposed to level invariance would lead us to so-called
strict utility models, see e.g. (Luce and Suppes, 1965), the best known instance of which is Pr(x|u,B) =
(u(x))t/∑y(u(y))t .
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generalized logit representation of choice probabilities. Specifically, given the earlier
axioms, narrow bracketing implies the value function v(x) = exp{λ ·u(x)+w(x)} where
w(x) does not depend on the utilities as such. This representation of choice probabilities
coincides with the “generalized logit” form derived from rational inattention in discrete
choice (Matejka and McKay, 2015), as indicated in the Introduction.
Definition 1 (Generalized logit). Consider a DM with utility u. The choice probabilities
are generalized logit if there exist λ ∈R and w : X →R such that for all finite B⊆ X and
all x ∈ B,
Pr(x|u,B) = v(x)/ ∑
x′∈B
v(x′) with v(x) = exp{λ ·u(x)+w(x)}. (5)
Generalized logit allows the non-utility components w(x) to be option specific, i.e.
behaviorally relevant. Matejka and McKay consider a DM not knowing his utilities and
sampling utilities to learn about the optimal option. In this context, the non-utility com-
ponent of the choice propensities relate prior beliefs about optimal actions and the in-
formational strategy of DM, which essentially depends on the perceived similarity of
options. This implies that Matejka and McKay’s model relaxes IIA. In the present con-
text, the non-utility components of choice propensities, w(x), relate to the presentation of
the choice task as I discussed below.
If w(x) = const, these components cancel out and choice probabilities are logit.
Definition 2 (Logit). Consider a DM with utility u. The choice probabilities are logit if
there exists λ ∈ R such that for all finite B⊆ X and all x ∈ B,
Pr(x|u,B) = v(x)/ ∑
x′∈B
v(x′) with v(x) = exp{λ ·u(x)}. (6)
Clearly, any axiom bridging generalized logit and logit needs to rule out presentation
effects by setting w(x) = const. Any such axiom is equivalent to assuming that choice
depends solely on true utility, i.e. that decision utility equals true utility.7 This effect can
be achieved in various ways. For the purpose of the present analysis, I invoke permutation
invariance—permuting choice probabilities is equivalent to permuting utilities—but for
clarity, I refer to the axiom as “decision utility = true utility”.
7Recall that the true utility is u(x) by assumption. Correspondingly, and taking generalized logit with
value function v(x) = exp{λ ·u(x)+w(x)} as given, let me define the decision utility to be u(x)+w(x)/λ.
8
Axiom 5 (Decision utility = true utility). Given any bijective function f : X → X and
any B⊆ X , Pr( f (x) |u,B) = Pr(x |u◦ f ,B) for all x ∈ B.
Now we are equipped to establish the result.
Theorem 1. Consider a decision maker with utility u, in a choice environment satisfying
richness with choice probabilities Pr(·) satisfying positivity.
1. Pr(·) has a logit representation⇔ Pr(·) satisfies Axioms 2, 4, and 5.
2. Pr(·) has a generalized logit representation⇔ Pr(·) satisfies Axioms 2 and 4.
Proof. I proof that the axioms imply logit and generalized logit representation, respec-
tively. The other direction, that the two representations satisfy the respective axioms, is
immediate. To simplify notation, define ux = u(x) for all x ∈ X . I say that ux is interior if
there exist x′,x′′ such that u(x′)< ux < u(x′′).
Step 1: By positivity and IIA, for any B⊆ X ,
Pr(x|u,B) = V
(
ux,uy,{x,y}
)
∑x′∈BV
(
ux′,uy,{x′,y}
) for all x,y ∈ B, (7)
with V
(
ux,uy,{x,y}
)
:= Pr(x|u,{x,y})/Pr(y|u,{x,y}). The argument, building on IIA,
is well-known, see e.g. McFadden (1974, p. 109). Note that V (uy,uy|{y,y}) = 1.
Step 2: Then, by Axiom 4 and richness⇒ there exists a function V˜ : R×X2→ R such
that V
(
ux,uy,{x,y}
)
= V˜
(
ux−uy,{x,y}
)
.
Axiom 4 holds for all r ∈ R, which implies
d Pr(x|u+ r,B)
dr
= 0 for all r ∈ R and B⊆ X . (8)
Thus, dV
(
ux+ r,uy+ r,{x,y}
)
/dr = 0 for all r, which implies ∂V/∂ux =−∂V/∂uy, and
by (7) it holds for all uy, which implies ∂2V/∂ux∂uy = 0. Hence, functions Vd , f and g
exist such that
V
(
ux,uy,{x,y}
)
=Vd
(
f (ux)−g(uy),{x,y}
)
with f ′(ux) = g′(uy) (9)
for all x,y. By richness, dV
(
ux+ r,uy+ r,{x,y}
)
/dr = 0 also holds for all interior ux,uy,
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which implies f ′(ux) = g′(uy) = const and a function V˜ exists such that
V
(
ux,uy,{x,y}
)
= V˜
(
ux−uy,{x,y}
)
(10)
Step 3: Then, by richness, V
(
ux,uy,{x,y}
)
= exp{λ · (ux−uy)+d(x,y)}.
Note that given x ∈ X , Eq. (7) holds true for all y ∈ X , and by richness, this implies that
there exists y ∈ X such that
d
dr
V
(
ux,uy+ r,{x,y}
)
V
(
ux,uy+ r,{x,y}
)
+1
= 0 for r ≈ 0. (11)
Hence, V (ux,uy + r|B) = V (ux,uy|B) · f (r) for all interior ux,uy and r ≈ 0, for some
function f :R→Rwith f (0) = 1. By (10), this implies V˜ (ux−uy−r|B) = V˜ (ux−uy|B) ·
f (r) for all r ≈ 0, and differentiating we obtain V˜ ′(ux− uy|B) = V˜ (ux− uy|B) · f ′(0).
Solving this differential equation, V˜ (ux−uy|B) = exp{λ ·(ux−uy)+d} using λ := f ′(0),
i.e.
V
(
ux,uy,{x,y}
)
= exp{λ · (ux−uy)+d(x,y)}. (12)
Step 4: Then, (7) holds true for V
(
ux,uy,{x,y}
)
= exp{λ ux+w(x)} for some w(x).
Using V as characterized in the previous step, uy cancels out and we obtain
Pr(x|u,B) = exp{λ ·ux+d(x|y)}
∑x′∈B exp{λ ·ux′+d(x′|y)}
. (13)
Since the choice probabilities are independent of the option y ∈ X chosen as benchmark
(Step 1), functions w,w2 exist such that d(x,y) = w(x)+w2(y). Thus, w2(y) cancels out,
confirming “⇐” in statement 2 of the Theorem.
Step 5: Then, by Axiom 5, (7) holds true for V
(
ux,uy,{x,y}
)
= exp{λ ux}.
Axiom 5 implies w(x) = w(y) for all x,y ∈ X . For contradiction, fix x,y such that w(x) 6=
w(y) and fix a bijection f : X → X such that f (x) = y. By assumption, Axiom 5 yields
Pr( f (x)|u,B) = Pr(x |u◦ f ,B), i.e.
exp{λ ·u( f (x))+w( f (x))}
∑x′∈B exp{λ ·u( f (x′))+w( f (x′))}
=
exp{λ ·u( f (x))+w(x)}
∑x′∈B exp{λ ·u( f (x′))+w(x′)}
This contradicts w(x) 6= w(x′) if B = {x,y}, given f (x) = y 6= x. Hence, w(x) = w(y) for
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all x,y ∈ X , confirming “⇐” in statement 1 of the Theorem.
3 Discussion
Multinomial logit is widely used to estimate utility and demand functions. McFadden
(2001) argues that its appeal relates to its lean axiomatic foundation, which appears to
rest largely on independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). The appearance is wrong,
as a closer look at the axioms in McFadden (1974) has revealed. Axiom 3 implicitly
assumes that binomial choice is logit, while IIA serves to extend logit to multinomial
choice. The present paper provides the first self-contained axiomatic foundation of logit,
uncovering two hidden assumptions: “narrow bracketing” and “true utility = decision
utility”. These findings have several notable implications, which are discussed in this
concluding section: They clarify the behavioral foundation of logit’s specific functional
form, relate logit to the central debate in behavioral welfare economics, and suggest
routes for future work by including presentation effects in generalized logit analyses.
The implications are discussed in this order.
The specific functional form of multinomial logit has repeatedly been questioned by
applied and behavioral economists. While it is typically accepted that choice is stochas-
tic, the notion that the underlying utility perturbations have specifically an extreme value
distribution, as opposed to a normal distribution or any other one, seems more difficult
to accept. In light of the axiomatic foundation derived here, the underlying assumptions
can now be discussed one by one. To begin with, positivity and IIA do not affect the
functional form of choice propensities. Similarly, richness does not affect the functional
form, as it is merely an assumption about the environment from which the analyst or ex-
perimenter constructs the budget set. Narrow bracketing postulates that the utility level
realized outside the analyzed choice tasks does not affect behavior. This assumption is
made almost universally in behavioral and empirical analyses (including least-squares
analyses), but its validity should probably be scrutinized by future work. This promises
to be a hard task, however. The most progressive existing work allows utility parameters
to depend on demographic variables (see e.g. Bellemare et al., 2008, in behavioral eco-
nomics), which of course does not violate narrow bracketing. Finally, the axiom “true
utility= decision utility” is vividly debated in behavioral welfare economics, as reviewed
in the Introduction (for an overview of the debate, see e.g. Ko˝szegi and Rabin, 2008b).
Regardless of one’s position in this debate, dropping the axiom does not fundamentally
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affect the functional form. Dropping it yields a generalized form of logit where the deci-
sion maker (DM) with utility function u chooses x ∈ B with probability
Pr(x|u,B) = exp{λ ·u(x)+w(x)}
∑x′∈B exp{λ ·u(x′)+w(x′)}
. (14)
Before I turn to discussing the non-utility related component w(x), let us appreciate the
difference to least squares approaches. Given utility function u, parameter vector p, and
set of observations O, take any observation o ∈ O and let o?(u, p) denote the model’s
prediction given u, p in the respective choice task. The sum of squared deviations of
observations from predictions is
SSq(p|u,O) = ∑
o∈O
(o−o?(u, p))2 = log∏
o∈O
exp{(o−o?(u, p))2}.
Aside from the missing normalization toward choice probabilities, this fits generalized
logit with the additional assumptions that true utility itself is choice-irrelevant (λ = 0)
and that discrete choice is presentation dependent in the specific sense that the quadratic
distance to the utility maximizer counts, w(x) = (x− x?(u, p))2. These assumptions are
not supported by behavioral or normative results (in the context of discrete choice). The
other assumptions, narrow bracketing and IIA, are maintained in least squares analyses.
Narrow bracketing is maintained in the sense that, when utility parameters are estimated,
outside endowments are generally neglected in utility functions. IIA is satisfied if the
utility maximizer o? is taken to be the utility maximizer over the global environment X
(which implies that it is independent of the specific budget set B imposed in the analyzed
choice task). Thus, the difference between the functional forms of logit and least squares
are specifically in the assumptions on the relation of decision utility and true utility. Gen-
eralized logit obtains without any restriction on the relation of true utility and decision
utility and therefore imposes strictly weaker assumptions than least squares—despite the
seemingly specific functional form.
Now, let us turn to the implications of dropping the axiom “true utility = decision
utility”. Dropping the axiom implies that decision utility regarding x ∈ X consists of
two components, the true utility, which is u(x) by assumption, and a second component
w(x). The existing literature suggests a clear interpretation of w(x). Following Ko˝szegi
and Rabin (2008b), the difference between true utility and decision utility represents
choice biases that prevent subjects from maximizing their true utility. Various such biases
12
Figure 1: Dictator game transfers with manual and graphical (“slider”) choice entering
(a) Andreoni and Miller (2002)
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(b) Fisman et al. (2007)
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Note: In a dictator game (DG), the dictator is endowed with a budget of B tokens, of which he may transfer
any number to an anonymous recipient. The above histograms show the distribution of choices for specific
tasks in two seminal DG experiments. In these cases, for each token given up by the dictator, two tokens
are added to the recipients account (approximately so in Fisman et al., 2007).
have been identified in the literature. DMs are inclined to select default options if they
exist (McKenzie et al., 2006; Dinner et al., 2011; Spiegler, 2015), they respond to the
ordering or positioning of options (Dean, 1980; Miller and Krosnick, 1998; Feenberg
et al., 2015), they respond overly to the left-most digit in multi-digit comparison (Poltrock
and Schwartz, 1984; Lacetera et al., 2012), and they focus on round numbers in numerical
choice (Heitjan and Rubin, 1991; Manski and Molinari, 2010).
To illustrate the magnitude of such biases, Figure 1 provides histograms of transfers
in dictator games from two experiments under mostly identical conditions (in a dictator
game, the dictator chooses how much of his income to transfer to the recipient). Essen-
tially, the only difference between the experiments is the user interface: the number of
tokens to be transferred is entered either manually (Figure 1a) or graphically, via mouse
and slider (Figure 1b). The choice tasks are otherwise virtually equivalent, but the dif-
ferences in choice patterns are drastic. The manual entry of numbers induces strong
round number effects, which in turn biases parameter estimates. Specifically, analyses
of dictator games typically assume that true utility is CES altruism and that it equates
with decision utility. CES altruism does not account for the behavioral implications of
the user interface, and thus, even if true utility u indeed is CES altruism, decision utility
differs. Given the above results on generalized logit, these differences are captured by
the non-utility component w, and neglecting it biases estimates of true utility u. This is
in principle known at least since Heitjan and Rubin (1991), but discrete choice models
capturing such effects have not yet been proposed.
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Generalized logit provides a versatile model to study non-utility components of
choice propensities, as it is generally applicable without imposing ex-ante restrictions
on the relation of true utility and decision utility. The best-known choice biases are those
discussed above and result from the presentation of choice tasks. The idea that presenta-
tion affects choice is also the basis of nudging and thus behavioral welfare economics. In
the context of presentation effects, it is intuitive to refer to w(x) as the focality of option
x, or as its mental luminescence. Being the default affects focality, positioning of options
affects focality, the left-most digit does, as does the roundness of numbers. The focality
w(x) of option x may well be defined in absolute terms, independently of the focality of
other objects, similarly to physical luminescence and thus honoring IIA. The behavioral
impact of an option’s focality depends on the focality of the other options in the budget
set, of course, analogously to the utility of options, which is defined in absolute terms but
can be interpreted only in relation to the utilities of other options. Thus, neither utility
nor focality necessarily violate IIA.8
Currently, little is known about the focality-related component w(x) of choice propen-
sities predicted by generalized logit. Major biases are identified, however, and intuitive
representations can be constructed for each bias. For example, w(x) may be a function
of x’s positioning, left-most digit, level of roundness, or its relation to the default. This,
in turn, illustrates the potential of further theoretical, empirical, and experimental work,
which is intriguing. Generalized logit provides a first versatile model to study focality
and choice biases, and at the same time, it is highly tractable and relates closely to the
models used currently (multinomial logit or generalizations such as nested logit). Thus,
it allows choice biases to be studied in the same manner that utility has been studied for
decades. Generalized logit is equally applicable to study biases in consumer choice (e.g.
left-digit bias) or strategic choice (e.g. to control for the impact of ordering of actions).
Understanding choice biases, i.e. understanding how w(x) depends on presentation, in
turn allows to obtain unbiased estimates of the true utility u(x) in behavioral economics,
of the willingness to pay in consumer choice, and the depth of reasoning in strategic
choice. Combined, this provides a general approach to analyze and predict nudging
effects. Thus, generalized logit promises to substantially facilitate work in behavioral
economics, empirical economics, and behavioral welfare.
8Having said that, maintaining IIA is simply one possibility here. The examples of choice biases dis-
cussed above mostly do not indicate that IIA must be relaxed, probably with the exception of “positioning”
depending on context, but other biases such as similarity effects or “salience” generally require relaxing
IIA (for recent discussions, see e.g. Ko˝szegi and Szeidl, 2013, and Matejka and McKay, 2015).
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